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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Cold War foreign policy underwent a dramatic shift between 1976 and 1980.  
Before 1970, the United States Cold War foreign policy was based on George Kennan’s 
containment policy.  Specifically, Kennan argued, “the United States should pursue a 
long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”1  
To do so, Kennan suggested the United States “apply a counter-force at a series of 
constantly shifting geographical and political points.”2  In 1970, with the help of National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, President Nixon revised and updated George 
Kennan’s containment policy.  In doing so, Nixon and Kissinger introduced détente to the 
United States and its containment-based Cold War foreign policy.  Détente sought to 
“release containment from its moralistic underpinnings and to inaugurate a power-
oriented Realpolitik.  The Soviet Union would be given incentives, largely economic, to 
moderate its expansion.  It would thus practice a kind of self-containment.”3  Until 1976, 
the United States Cold War foreign policy was firmly grounded in both containment and 
détente.  However, in 1976, with the election of Jimmy Carter, everything changed.  The 
newly elected President Carter sought to base his Cold War foreign policy on human 
rights.  Specifically, Jimmy Carter hoped to use both human rights and economic 
negotiations to work with and not against the Soviet Union.  By 1980, it was clear that 
President Carter’s human rights based Cold War foreign policy had failed.  Consequently, 
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in the fall of 1980, President Carter was denied a second term and Ronald Reagan was 
elected.  President Reagan’s Cold War foreign policy was simple: only a massive military 
build-up could contain the Soviet Union.   
Why, for a period of four years between 1976 and 1980, did the United States 
Cold War foreign policy shift from one focused on containing the Soviet Union to one 
focused on human rights and finally to one that again (although by different means) 
focused on containing (and ultimately destroying) the Soviet Union?  Like most 
politicians, the President of the United States acts strategically.  Consequently, the policy 
choices the President makes are based on strategic decisions, which rely on information.  
For a policy to be successful, it must be based on a diverse array of accurate information.  
During the Cold War, the United States Cold War foreign policy was strategic and relied 
on information for success.  Between 1947 and 1980, each president utilized various 
types of information to make his Cold War foreign policy successful.  The many Cold 
War related international events that took place in real time certainly provided each Cold 
War president with crucial information, as did information provided by various 
presidential advisors and experts.  As publicly elected officials, the presidents of the Cold 
War sought information from the public.  Specifically, because each president desired re-
election, he sought public approval of his policies.  Although unpredictable international 
events and changing presidential advisors both are credible explanations for the shift in 
Cold War foreign policy that took place between 1976 and 1980, changing public opinion 
also undoubtedly played a role in the shifts that occurred between 1976 and 1980. 
 In general, the president can get information on public opinion in one of three 
ways.  He may check his approval rating, look at nationally conducted polls (on specific 
  3 
issues), or look for some other measure to gauge public opinion.  One method of gauging 
public opinion is to look at the opinions of elite media members.  Although elite media 
members do not necessarily represent the general public, they provide the general public 
with the information and analysis necessary for opinion formation. Although most 
respectable news media sources provide the general public with accurate information, not 
all news media outlets provide the public with the type of analysis that is necessary for 
opinion formation. Consequently, the opinions of the elite members of the news media 
who do offer the general public information analysis are of great importance to 
politicians, especially those who seek re-election (i.e. the president).  This thesis suggests 
that a shift in the opinions of elite members of the media between 1976 and 1980 played 
a significant role in the change in Cold War foreign policy that took place between 1976 
and 1980. 
Before 1980,4 the ways in which the general public received information and 
analysis from members of the elite news media were very different than the ways in 
which the general public receives information today.  Today, the term elite news media 
could be used to describe a variety of diverse news media outlets that cover current 
events at local, state, federal, and international levels.  Newspapers, magazines, scholarly 
journals, radio, television, and, increasingly, the internet all play critical roles in the 
coverage of foreign policy events in today’s society.  Although newspapers, scholarly 
journals, news magazines, radio, and basic broadcast television have been providing 
foreign policy coverage for nearly a century,5 both cable television and the internet are 
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relatively recent inventions.6  Consequently, before 1980, the American general public 
received its foreign policy information and analysis from television broadcast, the radio, 
newspaper coverage, nationally syndicated magazines, or from scholarly journals.  Until 
the 1980’s and the introduction of CNN, television news broadcasts did not engage in the 
type of foreign policy analysis found in newspaper editorial sections, certain magazines, 
and in some scholarly journals.  While the general public had access to newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and some scholarly journals, this thesis focuses on the analysis offered 
by nationally syndicated newspaper editorialists in order to better understand how and 
why the United States Cold War foreign policy shifted between 1976 and 1980.  
Newspaper editorials were chosen because between 1976 and 1980 they had a large 
audience.  “Daily circulation of American newspapers peaked in 1984 and had fallen 
nearly 13% to 55.2 million copies in 2003, according to the Newspaper Association of 
America.”7  By understanding the debate being waged in national newspaper editorials 
(regarding the United States Cold War foreign policy), it is possible to better understand 
the shifts that occurred in Cold War foreign policy between 1976 and 1980. 
The large number of newspaper articles, magazine stories, and scholarly 
manuscripts published on American Cold War foreign policy between 1976 and 1980 
makes it clear that the Cold War foreign policy of the United States was on the minds of 
most American citizens between 1976 and 1980.  As a result, the editorial sections of 
many influential American newspapers were filled with interpretations and analyses of 
Cold War foreign policy related events on a daily basis.  This thesis seeks to understand 
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  5 
how and why different American newspaper editorial sections reached different 
conclusions about the direction of America’s Cold War foreign policy.  Were the 
opinions, analyses, and conclusions offered by newspaper editorialists across the country 
based on political beliefs or were they based on unbiased information alone? Did the 
conclusions reached in newspaper editorials affect the Cold War foreign policies of 
various presidents? 
 Unlike the front page of the newspaper, the editorial sections of most major 
American newspapers are filled with politically biased information.  “The editorial 
section of an elite paper, like any other, represents a paper’s stand and position on the 
issues discussed in the paper.”8  Some American newspapers are said to be liberal, others 
are said to be conservative.  Without a concrete method of identifying a newspaper’s 
ideology it is impossible to prove whether or not a paper’s editorials simply reflect its 
political ideology or if they serve a different purpose.  For the purpose of this thesis, the 
political ideologies of nine different prominent United States newspapers have been 
identified using political endorsements.   
Specifically, The New York Times, The Boston Globe, The New York Post, The 
Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, The Wall Street Journal, and The Daily Oklahoman all made presidential 
endorsements in 1972, 1976, and 1980.  By identifying which candidate each paper 
endorsed in each election, it is possible to place each newspaper along a political 
spectrum.  The New York Times and The Boston Globe endorsed the liberal (Democratic) 
presidential candidate in all three elections.  Therefore, for the purpose of this study, both 
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newspapers will be placed on the far left (liberal) side of the political spectrum.  The 
Washington Post endorsed the liberal (Democratic) candidate in two presidential 
elections (1976 and 1980) and endorsed no candidate during the 1972 presidential 
election.  Thus, The Washington Post will be placed slightly to the right of both The New 
York Times and The Boston Globe.  The New York Post endorsed the liberal (Democratic) 
presidential candidate in 1972 and 1976 but endorsed the Republican candidate in 1980.  
Consequently, for this study, The New York Post has been placed slightly to the right of 
The Washington Post.  The Los Angeles Times has a long-standing policy of not 
endorsing candidates during presidential elections.  For this study, The Los Angeles Times 
has been placed in the middle of the political spectrum.  The Philadelphia Inquirer 
endorsed the conservative (Republican) candidate for president in two elections (1972 
and 1976) and endorsed the liberal (Democratic) candidate in one election 1980.  
Therefore, for this study, The Philadelphia Inquirer has been placed to the right of The 
Los Angeles Times.  The Chicago Tribune, The Wall Street Journal and The Daily 
Oklahoman all were determined to be strong supporters of the Republican Party as all 
three endorsed the conservative (Republican) presidential candidate in each of the three 
elections studied.  Consequently, all three were placed on the far right of the political 
spectrum.  
 
Far Right        Center              Far Left 
Chicago Tribune    Philadelphia   Los Angeles Times   New York   Washington  New York       
            Inquirer            Post    Post            Times 
Daily Oklahoman          Boston Globe 
Wall Street Journal 
 
 
  7 
Most of the Cold War foreign policy editorials published between 1976 and 1980 
in the nine above-mentioned newspapers fell along political ideological lines.  That is, 
editorials published in The New York Times, Boston Globe, Washington Post, and New 
York Post favored the Cold War foreign policies of President Carter (the liberal 
president).  Consequently, most of the Cold War foreign policy related editorials 
published in conservative newspaper editorial sections criticized the foreign policies of 
President Carter.  However, not all published editorials followed the political ideology 
pattern.  Specifically, during the 1976 presidential election, some liberal newspapers 
supported Cold War foreign policies they had previously never supported.  Once the 1976 
Presidential election was over and President Carter’s human rights based Cold War 
foreign policies began to falter, his support in liberal newspapers began to fade.  As 
President Carter altered his Cold War foreign policies by shifting them to the right, 
conservative newspaper editorialists shifted their own Cold War foreign policy opinions 
even further right and began to endorse Cold War foreign policies they had never 
previously endorsed.  In both elections, the presidential candidates responded to the 
opinions put forth by members of the elite media.  When liberal newspaper editorialists 
called for an end to détente, Jimmy Carter obliged.  When conservative newspaper 
editorial sections asked for a Cold War foreign policy that was more conservative than 
containment or détente, Ronald Reagan introduced an extremely conservative Cold War 
foreign policy that would ultimately lead to an arms race.  By examining five events, the 
1976 presidential election, the 1978/1979 SALT II negotiations, the 1979 Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan (and the United States response), the 1980 Olympic boycott, and the 1980 
presidential election, it is possible to see that newspaper editorial sections did not always 
  8 
follow ideological lines.  Furthermore, when newspaper editorialists called for a change 
in Cold War foreign policy, both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan listened. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  9 
SECTION I 
Cold War Foreign Policy and the 1976 Presidential Election 
 
 
 
 
The 1976 presidential election was highly competitive9 and consequently received 
a significant amount of newspaper editorial coverage.  Although many important policy 
issues were discussed in editorial pages across the United States, American foreign policy 
was a topic of particular importance.  In 1976, many newspapers devoted a significant 
portion of their election coverage to foreign policy.  For example, The Los Angeles Times 
devoted 43.1%10 of its 1976 presidential election coverage to American foreign policy. 
American foreign policy is a broad subject, but in 1976 many newspapers narrowed their 
focus to how both candidates would address American foreign policy as it related to the 
Cold War.  Some newspapers saw little difference between the Cold War foreign policy 
proposals of President Ford (Republican) and Governor Carter (Democrat).  However, 
several important American newspapers saw significant differences between the 
proposals of President Ford and Governor Carter.  Consequently, such newspapers spent 
a significant amount of newspaper editorial space lauding the foreign policy proposals of 
one candidate and criticizing the foreign policy proposals of the other candidate.  
Specifically, the liberal newspaper editorial sections (The Boston Globe, The New York 
Times, The Washington Post, and The New York Post) favored Governor Carter while the 
conservative newspaper editorial sections (The Daily Oklahoman, The Wall Street 
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Journal, The Chicago Tribune, and The Philadelphia Inquirer) favored President Ford.  
Many of the liberal newspapers that supported Governor Carter did so not only because 
he was the Democratic candidate, but also because he offered the new type of Cold War 
foreign policy they sought.  
President Ford was the Republican candidate in 1976.  He had not been elected, 
but had been appointed to the position after the resignation of Richard Nixon in August 
of 1974.  Like his predecessor, Ford supported the détente policy developed by Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger.  In broad terms, détente “rested on the perception that the 
United States was finding it increasingly difficult to sustain the demands of containment. 
Détente sought to release containment from its underpinnings and to inaugurate a power-
oriented Realpolitik.”11  Détente sought to ease tensions with the USSR by establishing 
dialogue.  President Ford also supported the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Agreement 
(SALT), which was agreed upon in 1972. 
In contrast, Governor Carter believed that détente and containment had resulted in 
an over-exposed, morally questionable United States.  Although Governor Carter did not 
oppose the SALT Treaty that was signed in 1972, he promised a Cold War foreign policy 
that focused on a global community and human rights.  During his campaign, Governor 
Carter flatly disagreed with the foreign policies of Kissinger and Ford arguing that 
American foreign policy required both realism and idealism.  Early in his campaign, 
Jimmy Carter realized that a foreign policy platform based on human rights gave him the 
potential to build a non-partisan base.  “For liberals, a human rights foreign policy 
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promised a crusade against right-wing dictators, for conservatives, human rights offered a 
lever against communism and its abuses.”12 
Throughout the 1976 Presidential election, the three most conservative 
newspapers, (The Wall Street Journal, The Daily Oklahoman, and The Chicago Tribune) 
supported President Ford’s détente and containment based foreign policy.  Although their 
support of Ford was partially based on their political ideology, each newspaper editorial 
section supported President Ford’s Cold War foreign policy explicitly.  Furthermore, the 
editorial sections of each conservative newspaper also harshly criticized the human rights 
based Cold War foreign policy proposed by Governor Carter.  On October 14, The Wall 
Street Journal wrote “the more [Carter] talks about curing the problem of foreign policy 
by making it more open, the more one concludes he simply doesn’t understand the issues, 
that he hasn’t the foggiest notion of the decisions he would be called upon to make as 
President.”13  On October 8, by way of contrast, The Wall Street Journal lauded the 
Nuclear Proliferation policy of President Ford as a “major step forward.”14  On October 
31, The Daily Oklahoman called Governor Carter’s foreign policy radical: “Americans 
are rejecting [Carter’s] new-found radicalism, as his nationwide exposure has revealed a 
disturbing tendency to say whatever he believes to be popular.”15  In the same editorial, 
The Daily Oklahoman applauded President Ford’s ability to “stabilize”16 American 
foreign policy.  
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The Chicago Tribune also published editorials that supported President Ford’s 
conservative Cold War foreign policy.  On April 6, The Chicago Tribune called the 
debate on foreign policy a non-debate, “[The democratic position on foreign policy] is 
mainly campaign rhetoric from a candidate (Carter) who has no chance of replacing 
President Ford in the White House.”17  As the election progressed and the parties both 
chose their candidates, The Chicago Tribune continued to support President Ford:  “If 
Carter continues to promise solutions to foreign policy ills without presenting some 
tentative ways and means, he may discover the American public is more discerning and 
intelligent than he believes.”18  Finally, on October 14, The Chicago Tribune called 
Governor Carter naive when it came to American foreign policy.  Once both parties had 
chosen their candidates, only one instance could be found in which any of the extremely 
conservative papers were complimentary to the foreign policy proposals of Governor 
Carter.  On October 8, The Wall Street Journal noted that both candidates’ strategic arms 
limitations proposals were of good quality.      
Compared to The Wall Street Journal, The Daily Oklahoman, and The Chicago 
Tribune, The Philadelphia Inquirer provided its readers with significantly less coverage 
of the foreign policy debate in its editorial section between January 1, 1976 and 
December 31, 1976.  The Cold War foreign policy coverage that The Philadelphia 
Inquirer did provide was much different than the coverage found in the three most 
conservative newspapers.  For example, in its endorsement of President Ford on October 
31, The Philadelphia Inquirer lauded President Ford’s decision to continue the foreign 
policies of President Nixon.  However, in the same editorial, The Philadelphia Inquirer 
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praised Governor Carter’s ability to capture the imagination of the American people with 
his honest policies (including his foreign policy which focused on human rights).  Unlike 
The Wall Street Journal, The Daily Oklahoman, and The Chicago Tribune, The 
Philadelphia Inquirer chose to focus the majority of its 1976 presidential coverage (in the 
editorial section) on domestic policies.  Consequently, while the few instances in which 
The Philadelphia Inquirer editorial section mentioned foreign policy were conservative 
in nature, it is difficult to reach a conclusion about the paper’s overall view of American 
Cold War foreign policy during the 1976 Presidential election. 
The Los Angeles Times editorial section has been labeled neutral because the 
paper has a longstanding policy of not endorsing presidential candidates.  In terms of its 
coverage of Cold War foreign policy issues during the 1976 election, its neutral label 
rings true.  Although The Los Angeles Times had a slight liberal leaning (17.3% of its 
editorials favored Governor Carter), the overwhelming majority of its foreign policy 
editorials, (82.7%19), endorsed neither candidate.  For example, on October 8, The Los 
Angeles Times wrote, “although there were differences between the candidates, their 
television debate did not [reveal] a consensus on the fundamentals of foreign policy.”20  
While some newspaper editorials showed unwavering support of their preferred 
candidates’ Cold War foreign policy proposals, The Los Angeles Times chose to criticize 
both candidates throughout the 1976 presidential election campaign.  
Like The Philadelphia Inquirer, The New York Post chose not to devote a 
significant portion of its editorial section to Cold War foreign policy coverage during the 
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1976 presidential election.  Consequently, it is difficult to reach a conclusion about the 
paper’s ideological coverage of Cold War foreign policy during this time.  However, in 
one of the few times foreign policy is mentioned in their 1976 editorial sections, The New 
York Post was steadfast in its support of Governor Carter:  “A Ford victory would surely 
diminish any chance for an early breakthrough toward military sanity.”21 
The Washington Post’s editorial coverage of Cold War foreign policy was liberal 
but more balanced than the coverage provided by the two most liberal newspapers, The 
Boston Globe and The New York Times.  For example, while both The Boston Globe and 
The New York Times were often quick to criticize President Ford and his Cold War 
foreign policies, The Washington Post was not.  Although The Washington Post clearly 
supported the Cold War foreign policy proposals of Governor Carter during the 1976 
presidential election, its criticisms of President Ford often were muted.  On October 8, 
after the second presidential debate (which focused on American foreign policy), The 
Washington Post published an editorial that while clearly in support of Governor Carter 
was not critical of President Ford.  For example, the editorial praised President Ford for 
his ability “to work out a stable strategic equation with the Soviet Union.”22  However, in 
the same editorial, The Washington Post praised President Carter’s pledge to “conduct a 
foreign policy springing from the true values of the American people.”23 
The New York Times and The Boston Globe offered Governor Carter their 
complete support in terms of Cold War foreign policy.  In general, both The New York 
Times and The Boston Globe devoted large portions of their respective editorial sections 
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to supporting the Cold War foreign policy positions of Governor Carter while criticizing 
those of President Ford.  On September 9, The New York Times applauded Governor 
Carter’s “comprehensive”24 foreign policy plan, while criticizing President Ford’s foreign 
policy as “uninspiring, unimaginative, and intellectually clumsy.”25  Throughout the 1976 
presidential election, The New York Times published numerous foreign policy related 
editorials, 50.2% were liberal whereas 49.8% were neutral.26  During the 1976 
presidential election, The New York Times did not publish one editorial in support of 
President Ford’s foreign policy.  The Boston Globe editorial section was equally 
supportive of Governor Carter and critical of President Ford (in terms of their Cold War 
foreign policies).  It is clear from the above results that, for the newspapers studied, 
political ideology accurately predicted how each newspaper’s editorial section covered 
Cold War foreign policy during the 1976 presidential election.  These results are not 
surprising because a clear link exists between candidate endorsement and political 
ideology.  However, although a clear link exists between political ideology and candidate 
support, the large amount of coverage that each newspaper editorial section gave to the 
Cold War foreign policies of both candidates suggests that each newspaper had strong 
views on Cold War foreign policy.   
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SECTION II 
 
The New Cold War Foreign Policy and the Carter Administration 
 
 
 “Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of 
communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.  For 
too many years, we have been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and 
tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs.  We have 
fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water.  This 
approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty.  But 
through failure, we have now found our way back to our own principles and values and 
we have regained our lost confidence.”27 
 
 In 1976, the United States was still recovering from the embarrassment of 
Watergate and the horrors of the Vietnam War.  As a result, American citizens chose not 
to re-elect President Ford.  Instead, in the fall of 1976, the American public elected 
Jimmy Carter, the previously unknown democratic Governor of Georgia.  During his 
presidential campaign, Carter used anonymity to his advantage.  While President Ford 
focused on his White House accomplishments, Governor Carter promised the American 
people that he would “never tell a lie.”28  As President, Gerald Ford had already made his 
Cold War foreign policy clear: he would continue the policies put in place by President 
Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  As a governor, Jimmy Carter had little 
foreign policy experience, and he often refused to take a clear stance on the Cold War.  
When Carter did discuss American foreign policy and the Cold War, his answers were 
broad and emphasized the importance of human rights. Governor Carter however quickly 
seized on the liberal elite media’s cry for change in American Cold War foreign policy.  
Once elected, it quickly became evident to Jimmy Carter (and to those around him) that 
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his Cold War foreign policy would need to be more complex than a simple promise to 
focus on human rights.  Consequently, President Carter turned to two men, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Cy Vance, for advice on how he could create a Cold War foreign policy 
that focused on human rights.  The contrasting styles and beliefs of National Security 
Advisor Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance became evident during United States 
negotiations with the Soviet Union about a second Strategic Arms Limitations 
Agreement.  Eager to understand the new Cold War foreign policy of President Carter, 
many American newspapers devoted significant editorial space to SALT II. 
  Zbigniew Brzezinski was a polish-born expert on international relations.  He had 
published several articles and books condemning the détente Cold War foreign policies of 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger including, The Permanent Purge: Politics in 
Soviet Totalitarianism.29  Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski steadfastly believed the Soviet 
Union to be untrustworthy and a constant threat to American security.  Brzezinski was 
extremely critical of the original SALT treaty between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  He believed that both the United States and the Soviet Union “were still governed 
by the strategic doctrine of mutually assured destruction.”30  Furthermore, Brzezinski was 
highly skeptical of the Soviet Union’s promise to “behave itself in Africa and the Middle 
East.”31 Brzezinski saw the Soviet Union’s aggressive tactics in the Middle East as a far 
more important area of Cold War foreign policy than the SALT II treaty.  Ultimately, 
Brzezinski believed that the Soviet Union was solely responsible for international 
                                                
29
 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956). 
 
30
 Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt II (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 52. 
 
31
 Strobe Talbott, Endgame, 52. 
 
  18
instability.  Consequently, his “view of arms control and Soviet-American relations was 
quite different from the one underlying Kissinger’s theory of détente.  Kissinger believed 
arms control was an integral part of Soviet-American relations. . . Brzezinski saw SALT 
II as a way to enhance the stability of an essentially competitive relationship with the 
Soviet Union.”32  Unsurprisingly, National Security Advisor Brzezinski preferred to put 
SALT II negotiations aside and instead focus on issues such as the United States’ 
relationship with countries such as China, a tactic he believed would enrage the Soviet 
Union and offer the United States some form of protection. 
 Vance, on the other hand, viewed the United States’ relationship with the Soviet 
Union in a more positive light.  While Brzezinski believed that “any crisis in the world 
was a Soviet challenge,”33 Vance believed that any relationship of the United States’ with 
the Soviet Union should be rooted in straightforward negotiations and economic ties 
between the two countries.  Consequently, Vance believed the SALT II treaty to be the 
most important part of President Carter’s initial Cold War foreign policy.  Vance “saw 
SALT II as the central diplomatic issue and believed that no problem, even Russian 
aggressiveness in the Middle East, should be allowed to endanger arms talks.”34  
Furthermore, Vance believed he could use the promise of economic help to convince the 
Soviet Union to accept and implement Carter’s human rights agenda in their own foreign 
policies. 
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 Ultimately, the decision about how the United States would implement a new 
Cold War foreign policy came down to President Carter.   Ultimately, his decision would 
be based on whether he chose to adhere to the pessimistic view of the Soviet Union 
promoted by Brzezinski or the optimistic view promoted by Vance.  “Carter was not 
worried about conflicts, and relished their (i.e. Brzezinski’s and Vance’s) different ideas 
and lively debate.  The roles were clear to Carter: Zbig would be the thinker, Cy would 
be the doer, and Jimmy Carter would be the decider.”35  Unfortunately, President Carter 
initially chose neither view and instead took the middle road.  His new Cold War foreign 
policy managed to take both a pessimistic view of the Soviet Union as well as an 
optimistic one.  “As I have often said, our relationship with the Soviet Union is a mixture 
of cooperation and competition.”36  Throughout the SALT II negotiations, President 
Carter attempted to find the middle ground in the drastically different proposals given to 
him by Brzezinski and Vance.  Brzezinski insisted that any SALT II negotiations should 
be linked to other Soviet behavior (i.e. if the Soviets acted aggressively in the Middle 
East, Africa, or China, SALT II negotiations should be halted).  Vance believed the 
SALT II negotiations were too important to be halted for any reason.  President Carter’s 
conflicted new Cold War foreign policy received heavy criticism in several newspaper 
editorial sections across the country. 
As soon as President Carter took office, negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on SALT II began.  President Carter’s initial proposal to the Soviet 
Union was quickly rejected.  In his proposal (March, 1977) Carter included a 
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comprehensive arms reduction plan (most of the reductions fell to the Soviet Union) and 
reaffirmed his commitment to human rights.  The extremely liberal newspapers (The New 
York Times and The Boston Globe) that had enthusiastically supported Carter during his 
presidential campaign were again eager to endorse his new Cold War foreign policy.  
Both newspapers had gotten their way, and the country had a new President with a new 
Cold War foreign policy.  They applauded both his hard line and his adherence to human 
rights.  In March of 1977, The Boston Globe exclaimed, “President Carter has succeeded 
in establishing that American participation in accords, when they do come in the area of 
arms control, does not imply acceptance of Soviet mistreatment of her citizens.”37   In 
May of 1977, The New York Times praised President Carter’s approach to the SALT II 
negotiations as “realistic and plausible.”38   
Both The Washington Post and The New York Post also initially supported 
President Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy (i.e. his first round of SALT II 
negotiations).  On April 5, 1977, The Washington Post editorial section reported, 
“President Carter posed the Russians with some tough choices.  They chose not to 
respond.”39   Furthermore, on April 9, 1977, The Washington Post again endorsed 
President Carter’s initial SALT II tactics.  “President Carter can hardly be blamed for 
wanting to establish a reputation for toughness in dealing with the Russians, considering 
how previous presidents have suffered politically from charges of giving Moscow all the 
best of it in negotiating various agreements.”40   
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The Los Angeles Times, initially chose to support the SALT II negotiation policies 
of Jimmy Carter.  On April 6, 1977, The Los Angeles Times editorial section remarked, 
“the American proposals represent a reasonable basis for good faith negotiations if that is 
what Moscow wants.”41  Later, in June, The Los Angeles Times commented, “the Carter 
policy represents a good-faith American effort to establish a positive negotiating 
atmosphere, which strikes us as intelligent.”42  
While many newspaper editorials supported President Carter’s initial SALT II 
proposals, some criticized President Carter and his ideas.  The conservative newspapers 
that initially promoted a Cold War foreign policy based on détente and containment (as 
articulated by Gerald Ford) were against the new Cold War foreign policies of President 
Carter.  However, the criticism in The Philadelphia Inquirer was muted.  In fact, other 
than criticizing some of the comments President Carter made (regarding SALT II) while 
visiting with members of Congress, The Philadelphia Inquirer chose not to use their 
editorial section to cover President Carter’s initial SALT II proposals.  The criticism in 
The Chicago Tribune however was harsh and unrelenting.  For example, on April 2, 
1977, The Chicago Tribune commented that the foreign policy of the United States was, 
“morally and intellectually bankrupt.”43  Furthermore, on April 6, 1977, The Chicago 
Tribune criticized President Carter’s initial, failed SALT II proposal.  “President Carter is 
standing in the shambles of his SALT II [proposal], vowing he will never surrender on 
human rights.”44 
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Two extremely conservative newspapers, The Wall Street Journal and The Daily 
Oklahoman offered continued criticism of President Carter’s initial SALT II negotiations.  
Both The Wall Street Journal and The Daily Oklahoman sought a return to détente and 
containment.  On May 25, 1977, The Daily Oklahoman sharply criticized both President 
Carter’s SALT II proposals and his overall Cold War foreign policy.  The Daily 
Oklahoman devoted a significant amount of the editorial section that day to praising the 
“continuity of American foreign policy which has been one of the remarkable features of 
our government.”45  The paper concluded that both President Nixon and President Ford 
had adhered to the Cold War foreign policy of the past.  However, the paper feared that 
the radical Cold War foreign policies of President Carter were a departure from those of 
the past and put the United States in significant danger.  In June of 1977, The Daily 
Oklahoman called President Carter’s commitment to human rights laughable, “for all his 
championing of human rights elsewhere, President Carter has been markedly quiet about 
the 20,000 or more political prisoners rotting in Cuban jails.”46  
By 1979, President Carter had seen debacles in Africa, the Middle East, China, 
and in the Panama Canal threaten his SALT II proposal.  The events called into question 
his initial belief that the Soviet Union could be trusted.  President Carter was also 
receiving heavy criticism from both conservative and liberal newspaper editorial sections 
over his new Cold War foreign policy.  As a result of the heavy criticism he was 
receiving, President Carter began to alter his Cold War foreign policy, shifting it to the 
right.  Consequently, President Carter’s 1979 SALT II proposal was at odds with his 
evolving Cold War foreign policy.  Like Secretary of State Cy Vance, President Carter 
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initially had believed that the SALT II negotiations were the most important part of his 
new Cold War foreign policy.  However, the Soviet Union’s aggressive behavior in both 
Africa and the Middle East had opened his eyes.  Carter’s Cold War foreign policy 
adopted a more comprehensive approach as National Security Advisor Brzezinski had 
envisioned.  It also began moving more towards the right.  No longer could President 
Carter reconcile arms reduction negotiations with the aggressive behavior of the Soviet 
Union.  Consequently, by 1979, President Carter was forced to increase defense 
spending.  As a result, President Carter’s SALT II proposal began to look nothing like his 
Cold War foreign policy.  Many people, including the elite news media (i.e., newspaper 
editorial writers) became confused and disenchanted with President Carter’s SALT II 
proposals as a result.  By 1979, almost no newspaper editorial section, including those of 
extremely liberal newspapers (The New York Times and The Boston Globe) supported 
President Carter’s SALT II proposal. 
In a March 25, 1979 editorial, The New York Times indicated that Carter’s latest 
SALT II proposal would require the United States to give up on important missile 
technology.  The New York Times editorial section was stunned that President Carter 
would concede such an important part of the United States’ defense to the Soviet Union.  
“If SALT II prevents our exploiting an important technical advantage, can we afford 
it?”47  Carter initially believed SALT II to be so important that he ignored Brzezinski’s 
mistrust of the Soviet Union.  In April, The New York Times indicated that even if 
President Carter was able to get a SALT II Treaty signed, it did not believe the President 
would even have the support of his own party in the Senate (needed for the Treaty to be 
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ratified)48.  Meanwhile, The Boston Globe was equally unsupportive of President Carter’s 
SALT II proposal by 1979.  In January of 1979, President Carter gave a State of the 
Union Address in which he discussed his SALT II proposal.  The next morning, The 
Boston Globe criticized the President’s remarks on the SALTI II ratification efforts: “On 
foreign policy, President Carter chose to skirt the crisis in Iran and made only a brief pass 
through the Mideast situation.  His strongest remarks were on the need for SALT 
ratification.  Yet even here he failed to seize upon the nation’s undoubted thirst for arms 
control.”49  On September 25, 1979, The Boston Globe called President Carter’s SALT II 
proposal inadequate and urged the Senate not to accept the proposal.50   
By 1979, both The New York Post and The Washington Post had given up 
supporting President Carter’s SALT II proposal.  In fact, in August, The New York Post 
was calling for a return to détente and applauding former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger’s testimony on the SALT II Treaty that had been recently signed by President 
Carter and was awaiting ratification by the Senate.  Both Kissinger and the New York 
Post were appalled with the terms President Carter had agreed to in the SALT II Treaty.  
“Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted so radical a change in the military 
balance.”51  The Washington Post’s editorial section was equally critical of President 
Carter’s SALT II proposal:  “In our darkest fantasies, we sometimes support Carter’s 
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SALT II proposal.”52  Even the neutral Los Angeles Times was critical of President 
Carter’s SALT II Treaty by 1979. 
However, in 1979, the harshest criticism of President Carter’s SALT II Treaty 
came from the conservative newspaper editorial sections (The Philadelphia Inquirer, The 
Chicago Tribune, The Wall Street Journal, and The Daily Oklahoman).  On February 22, 
1979, The Daily Oklahoman called President Carter’s SALT II proposal “a tangle of 
contradictions that will only add to the global perception of the United States as a 
bumbling, impotent giant.”53  In May, The Chicago Tribune applauded the efforts of 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (as well as President Carter’s opponents) for 
their decision to oppose President Carter’s SALT II Treaty.  “We can thank the people 
who now oppose SALT II for awakening the country to the seriousness of the Soviet 
threat and the possibility of U.S. weakness.”54 
The shifting of support away from President Carter’s SALT II proposal (and 
subsequent SALT II Treaty) was an early indication that newspaper editorial sections 
across the country were beginning to lose faith in President Carter’s overall Cold War 
foreign policy.  Newspaper editorial sections were no longer willing to accept President 
Carter’s initial decision to treat the Soviet Union as both friend and foe.  Like many 
American citizens, newspaper editorial writers were beginning to fear the Soviet Union in 
a way reminiscent of earlier Cold War times.  Consequently, the liberal newspapers 
began to question President Carter’s SALT II proposals.  Meanwhile, conservative 
newspaper editorial sections were openly critical of President Carter’s SALT II proposals 
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and by 1979 were calling for a return to the Cold War foreign policies of past presidents 
(Nixon and Ford).  Due to national unrest over his Cold War foreign policy, President 
Carter was forced to make a choice (between the policies of Secretary of State Vance and 
those of National Security Advisor Brzezinski).  The Soviet Union’s behavior in Africa 
(and later in Afghanistan) forced President Carter to side with National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski, and Carter’s Cold War foreign policy shifted to one that focused primarily on 
the threats posed by the Soviet Union.  As a result, President Carter had no choice but to 
begin a competition with the Soviet Union.  President Carter’s new Cold War foreign 
policy set the stage for Ronald Reagan and the 1980’s. 
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SECTION III 
 
President Carter’s Cold War Foreign Policy Response to the Soviet Union’s 1979 
Invasion of Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, the late 1970’s were one of the worst times in American history for 
a President to have an ambiguous foreign policy.  By 1979, President Carter’s attempt to 
make human rights an integral part of his Cold War foreign policy had failed miserably.  
Meanwhile, his decision to appoint two high-ranking foreign policy officials (National 
Defense Advisor Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance) with contrasting Cold War 
perspectives had caused his Cold War foreign policy to slip into disarray.  By the end of 
President Carter’s first term in office, not even liberal newspaper editorial sections 
supported his Cold War foreign policy:  “Rather than serving as a rallying point for the 
administration, SALT II became a lightning rod that attracted attacks on the 
administration, on détente, and on SALT [in general].”55  The criticism already being 
heaped upon President Carter’s Cold War foreign policy (by both liberals and 
conservatives) exploded with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  If the tense, often 
nonsensical, SALT II negotiations were bad for President Carter’s human rights based 
Cold War foreign policy, the 1979 Soviet invasion was even worse.  After the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter had no choice but to alter his Cold 
War foreign policy.     
On January 4, 1980, President Carter responded to the Soviet Union’s December 
27, 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.  In a nationwide address, President Carter stated, “a 
                                                
55
 R.L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1985), 742. 
  28
Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to 
possible control over much of the world’s oil supply.”56  President Carter followed his 
January 4
th
 address with a harsh and direct message to the Soviet Union during his 1980 
State of the Union Address during which he unveiled the Carter Doctrine.  “Any attempt 
by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”57  President Carter’s State of 
the Union Address sent a clear message to Americans and Soviets alike -- the Cold War 
foreign policies of the Carter Administration had changed drastically.  President Carter’s 
new Cold War foreign policy would include containment and military force, two 
components the President had previously promised his Cold War foreign policy would 
never feature prominently.  
 The Carter Administration’s altered Cold War foreign policy called for a quick 
and harsh response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.  After news of the 
invasion, President Carter halted domestic grain sale to the Soviet Union, withdrew his 
SALT II Treaty from the Senate, suspended the sale of technology to the Soviet Union, 
curtailed Soviet fishing privileges, and asked Congress to drastically increase the defense 
budget of the United States.  President Carter also created a “Rapid Defense Force”58 and 
re-mandated draft registration.  By 1980, President Carter had introduced Presidential 
Directive 59, “which authorized American strategic forces to switch to a counterforce 
strategy, targeting nuclear weapons in their silos, indicating a dangerous shift in nuclear 
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policy from deterrence to one of a first-strike.”59  In August of 1980, President Carter 
declared the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan “the greatest threat to world peace 
[since World War II.]”60   
President Carter faced heavy criticism from both Democrats and Republicans as 
his Cold War foreign policy shifted from human rights to containment and military build-
up after the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan invasion.  Republicans criticized the President’s 
new Cold War foreign policy as being “too little, too late.”61  Many Republicans, 
including Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, believed the age of détente was dead.  
Meanwhile, many prominent Democrats (including Senator Edward Kennedy -- one of 
the President’s democratic rivals) wondered if President Carter’s reaction to the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan was an overreaction.  Although politicians from both 
political parties were quick to criticize the Carter Administration’s new Cold War foreign 
policy, newspaper editorialists were even quicker to do so. Conservative newspaper 
editorials criticized President Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy as not drastic enough 
and as being long overdue.  Some conservative newspaper editorialists even criticized 
President Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy as one that was already outdated.  
Specifically, they argued that détente, a Cold War foreign policy principle they had 
strongly supported only four years earlier (when supporting the Cold War foreign policies 
of Presidents Nixon and Ford), was now insufficient.  Such newspaper editorials 
supported Ronald Reagan and promoted the idea of an arms race.  The support President 
Carter had received from liberal newspaper editorial sections in 1976 had evaporated by 
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late 1979.  Universally, liberal newspaper editorialists condemned President Carter’s 
vacillating Cold War foreign policy.  Some liberal newspaper editorialists even agreed 
with their conservative counterparts, calling détente dead.  
During the 1976 presidential election, two of the nation’s most liberal 
newspapers, The New York Times and The Boston Globe, had offered President Carter’s 
human rights based Cold War foreign policy their strong support.  As human rights faded 
from President Carter’s Cold War foreign policy as a consequence of the Soviet Union’s 
behavior in the Middle East, Africa, and China, both The New York Times and The 
Boston Globe kept their criticism of the President to a minimum.  However, by the time 
President Carter’s SALT II Treaty was ready for Senate approval in 1979, neither The 
New York Times nor The Boston Globe could contain their criticism of President Carter’s 
Cold War foreign policy.  Both newspapers’ editorial sections reacted to the United 
States’ response to the Soviet Union in a similar way.  Both saw President Carter’s Cold 
War foreign policy as one in disarray.  Consequently, neither was surprised when the 
Soviet Union chose to invade Afghanistan.   
On December 29, 1979, The Boston Globe openly questioned President Carter’s 
Cold War foreign policy.  Many members of The Boston Globe’s editorial staff believed 
that the United States’ inept Cold War foreign policy made the Soviet Union’s invasion 
of Afghanistan possible:  “The Soviet Union, for all its deserved reputation for heavy-
handedness, does not toss troops around the world just for the sake of [it]. . . The United 
States is in no position to respond immediately, other than to protest.”62  On January 4, 
1980, The New York Times responded to the Soviet Union’s decision to invade 
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Afghanistan by writing, “the United States is so weak that the Russians have no fear of an 
American response to any move they make. . . The Soviets are following a master plan 
toward world conquest.”63  On January 6, 1980, the New York Times continued to criticize 
the Carter Administration’s Cold War foreign policy:  “The Carter Administration has 
made just about every mistake it could [with the Soviet Union], it has defied all the 
lessons we lave learned about the Soviets since the last world war.”64  Both papers 
believed President Carter’s ambiguous Cold War foreign policy played a role in the 
Soviet Union’s initial decision to invade Afghanistan.  On January 23, 1980, President 
Carter presented his altered Cold War foreign policy to the world during his 1980 State of 
the Union Address.  During his speech, President Carter introduced the Carter Doctrine, 
which specifically responded to his liberal critics.  However, neither The New York Times 
nor The Boston Globe was satisfied with President Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy.  
By mid-year, both papers were calling the Carter Administration’s new Cold War foreign 
policy (and its response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan) an overreaction.  
Both papers pushed for a return to containment, a conservative strategy popular during 
the time of Nixon and Ford.  However, both were against an arms race. 
Not surprisingly, less liberal newspapers (The Washington Post and The New York 
Post) were equally unimpressed with President Carter’s altered Cold War foreign policy.  
However, they disagreed with their liberal counterparts (The New York Times and The 
Boston Globe).  They argued that détente was over, and so was containment.  Both The 
Washington Post and The New York Post favored a military build-up, an idea popular 
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with both conservative politicians and conservative newspaper editorialists.  However, 
neither The Washington Post nor The New York Post favored a military build-up as 
extreme as that favored by some of the more conservative newspapers.  For example, a 
Washington Post editorial written December 30, 1979, just three days after the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan, was entitled, “Détente Is Dead.”65  Throughout 1980, The 
Washington Post continued to publish editorials that contained similar ideology, and The 
New York Post published similar editorials.  These editorials accused President Carter’s 
new Cold War foreign policy, which included containment, of being outdated.  Like 
many other newspaper editorial sections across the country, The New York Post saw the 
writing on the wall: détente between the United States and the Soviet Union was over.  
When commenting on President Carter’s Cold War foreign policy before the 1980 
Presidential election, The New York Post suggested that the policy of deterrence was no 
longer working.   “Afghanistan and quite possibly soon the entire Persian Gulf – shows 
the opposite is happening.  Nobody is being deterred. . . The lack of readiness of our 
armed forces is scandalous.”66  Throughout 1980, The Los Angeles Times sided with most 
liberal newspapers.  That is, they criticized President Carter’s new Cold War foreign 
policy, but not to the extent seen in many conservative newspapers.  For example, when 
commenting on the Carter Doctrine, The Los Angeles Times suggested that President 
Carter was being “much too tentative.”67 
Not only did the conservative newspaper editorial sections (The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, The Chicago Tribune, The Wall Street Journal, and The Daily Oklahoman) 
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reject President Carter’s altered Cold War foreign policy, they promoted an arms race 
with the Soviet Union.  Only four years earlier, all four papers had criticized President 
Carter for his decision to move away from détente.  By 1980, all four newspapers were 
rejecting détente in favor of a military build-up.  On January 7, 1980, The Wall Street 
Journal criticized President Carter’s decision to punish the Soviet Union only by 
economic sanctions:  “If the proverbial man from Mars had arrived just in time to listen 
to the sanctions President Carter outlines Friday night, we wonder if he ever would have 
guessed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a military [emphasis in the original 
text] operation. . . The American reaction should be military.”68  On January 24, 1980, 
The Chicago Tribune responded to President Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy with 
disdain.  The editorial writers at The Chicago Tribune did not believe that President 
Carter’s altered Cold War foreign policy went far enough.  They believed the United 
States needed to engage in, “an extensive buildup of conventional [military] forces.”69  
Furthermore, on August 14, 1980, The Chicago Tribune continued their assault of 
President Carter’s altered Cold War foreign policy.  “This sort of harebrained blundering 
has already damaged international confidence in American foreign policy so badly that 
another example of it will not make matters worse.  But when will President Carter learn 
that his foreign policy apparatus is a shambles, and that it must be corrected?”70 
On January 6, 1980, The Daily Oklahoman called for the United States to “strive 
to regain the advantage it frittered away [during the Carter administration] in a one-sided 
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pursuit of ‘détente.’”71  The Daily Oklahoman claimed the Soviet Union had never really 
believed in détente, they had simply said they did, and the Carter Administration had 
been duped.  As a result, The Daily Oklahoman believed the Soviet Union was already 
well ahead in an arms race in which they believed the United States must participate.  
Meanwhile, in August The Philadelphia Inquirer chastised President Carter’s new Cold 
War foreign policy saying, “it is time for firmness.”72  
President Carter’s reaction to the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan 
was somewhat unexpected.  When he took office in 1976, President Carter was intent on 
including human rights in his Cold War foreign policy.  Even as events unfolded in 
Africa, China, and the Middle East, President Carter was reluctant to change his Cold 
War foreign policy.  He saw negotiation with the Soviet Union as the key to success.  
Consequently, he spent a large amount of his Cold War foreign policy efforts engaging in 
SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan finally changed President Carter’s mind.  Due to the invasion, President 
Carter came to believe that a successful Cold War foreign policy must include 
containment and a military build-up.  The Soviet invasion also triggered an interesting 
reaction in newspaper editorial sections across the country.  It caused liberal newspapers 
to completely turn against President Carter and to support a policy (i.e. détente) they had 
universally lobbied against only 4 years earlier.  Meanwhile, the Soviet Union’s military 
action in Afghanistan also caused an interesting reaction in conservative newspaper 
editorial sections across the country in that they abandoned their support of détente in 
favor of a large military build-up. 
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SECTION IV 
 
The 1980 Olympic Boycott  
 
 
 
 
President Carter’s new, tough Cold War foreign policy was introduced in January 
1980 in the form of the Carter Doctrine.  In the Carter Doctrine, President Carter made it 
clear that he was willing to use both economic and military measures to punish the Soviet 
Union for invading Afghanistan.  Although President Carter’s new hard line on the Soviet 
Union solicited many responses from newspaper editorialists across the country, it was 
his threat to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow that received the most 
newspaper editorial coverage.  With his approval rating already slipping, President Carter 
decided to issue a threat to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics.  Most newspaper 
editorials had already heavily criticized President Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy 
as being either too late and not extreme enough (conservative newspaper editorials) or an 
overreaction (liberal newspaper editorials).  Consequently, it is somewhat surprising that, 
in the wake of such heavy criticism, President Carter chose to threaten a boycott of the 
1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.  However, once the decision was made, it was met 
with a surprising amount of support.  The same newspapers that had questioned President 
Carter’s grain sanctions (many newspaper editorials believed grain sanctions hurt 
American farmers) and return to détente now praised his decision to threaten a boycott of 
the 1980 Summer Olympics.  To understand why many newspaper editorials renounced 
President Carter’s altered Cold War foreign policy but supported his Olympic boycott 
threat, it is necessary to examine the relationship between sports (specifically the 
Olympics) and politics.  
  36
Until 1923, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) sought to “avoid all 
interference in the political sphere.”73  The IOC was well aware that the same 
international appeal that made the Olympics so popular also made them an easy political 
target.  “In an imperfect world, if participation in sport is to be stopped every time the 
politicians violate the laws of humanity, there will never be any international contests.”74  
Before to 1923, the IOC encountered few problems with its policy.  However, as 
coverage of the Olympics grew across the globe, countries began to use the Olympics as 
a political tool.  Specifically, the Olympic Games became a tool many countries used as a 
form of political protest throughout the Cold War.  In 1952, in Helsinki, the East 
Germans were denied the opportunity to participate in the Olympics.  In 1956, three 
international events led to an Olympic boycott by several countries.  Egypt, Lebanon, and 
Iraq boycotted the 1956 games to protest British and French involvement in the Suez 
Crisis.  The Soviet Union’s mismanagement of the Hungarian Revolution produced a 
boycott by Spain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.  Finally, China boycotted the 1956 
Summer Games because the Republic of China was allowed to participate.  In 1972, the 
Munich Games continued even after the death of eleven Israeli athletes.  Twenty-six 
countries boycotted the 1976 Winter Olympics after New Zeeland was allowed to 
participate (New Zeeland had recently played a rugby match in South Africa, a violation 
of Olympic rules). 
Thus, President Carter did not introduce political protest to the Olympic games.  
He did however bring political protest (in terms of the Cold War) to the forefront of 
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American athletics during the Spring of 1980.  President Carter’s decision to threaten a 
boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics was primarily based on his new Cold War foreign 
policy.  Primarily, President Carter hoped to use a United States boycott of the Moscow 
Summer Olympics, as a way of punishing the Soviet Union for its 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan.  President Carter also believed that a United States boycott of a Soviet held 
event would show the rest of the world that his Cold War foreign policy was strong.  
However, President Carter’s main battle was at home.  The success or failure of his 
proposed Olympic boycott was in the hands of the American people.  Realizing that 
many Americans (including most newspaper editorialists) did not support his new Cold 
War foreign policy, President Carter sought to connect his proposed Olympic boycott to 
domestic policy.  To do so, President Carter turned to history.  He asked Americans to 
view the proposed boycott like past American protests, specifically like the Olympic 
protests during World War II.  In doing so, President Carter sought to fuel his proposed 
boycott with American pride.  A January 1980 Gallup poll proved that President Carter’s 
campaign to connect domestic American spirit to his boycott threat was successful:  “The 
poll found that 75 percent of those surveyed favored a shift in sites, and, should that fail, 
56 percent supported a boycott.”75  Once President Carter realized he had successfully 
transformed his foreign policy by using a domestic policy (the threat of an Olympic 
boycott), he moved forward aggressively and with substantial support.    
Carter quickly solicited and received the support of the United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) in late January of 1980.  With the backing of both the American 
public and the USOC in place, President Carter set a February deadline for a Soviet troop 
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pullout from Afghanistan.  If the Soviet Union did not remove its troops from 
Afghanistan by late February, the United States would not participate in the 1980 
Summer Olympics in Moscow.  When the Soviet Union did not remove its troops from 
Afghanistan by President Carter’s deadline, the President instituted his boycott with 
broad public support.  By the time March 1980 arrived, President Carter’s Olympic 
boycott had received a large amount of newspaper editorial support.  By making the 
boycott a domestic issue, President Carter was able not only to bring his threatened 
Olympic boycott to fruition in March of 1980, but was able to do so with widespread 
support.  In fact, of the newspaper editorial sections surveyed, only The Daily Oklahoman 
disagreed with President Carter’s Olympic boycott. 
Although both The New York Times and The Boston Globe disagreed with 
President Carter’s altered Cold War foreign policy (i.e. a return to containment and an 
increase in defense spending), both supported his 1980 Olympic boycott.  By making the 
Olympic boycott a national pride issue, President Carter was able to isolate it from his 
unpopular new Cold War foreign policy.  For example, on January 16, 1980, a New York 
Times editorial urged President Carter to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics regardless 
of what transpired in Afghanistan.  “We should pull out now, ending uncertainty among 
American athletes and serving notice on the Russians that, no matter what happens in 
Afghanistan, their offense against international law will not be quickly forgotten.”76  
Meanwhile, The Boston Globe first supported President Carter’s proposal to shift the 
1980 Summer Olympics from Moscow to a neutral site.  When it became apparent that 
such a move was unlikely, The Boston Globe also supported an Olympic boycott.  Later 
in January, The New York Times continued to support the Olympic boycott citing both 
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American national pride as well as the negative effect a United States boycott would have 
on the Soviet economy:  “The biggest loser from an American boycott might be the 
Soviet Union itself.  Without Americans among them to help defray the costs, the 
Russians could be hard pressed to run the games in the black.”77 
Both The Washington Post and The New York Post also condemned President 
Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy but supported his proposed Olympic boycott.  On 
January 6, 1980, The Washington Post wrote, “to hold the 1980 Games in Moscow would 
be an honor for the Soviets.  To have the United States team there and competing would 
be a dishonor to America.”78  Furthermore, later in January, The Washington Post 
published another editorial supporting President Carter’s proposed Summer Olympic 
boycott.  In the editorial, The Washington Post cites the same historical examples that 
President Carter used when trying to persuade the general public that an Olympic boycott 
was necessary:  “A successful Olympiad would persuade the Soviet leadership that it has 
little to fear from the outside world, no matter what it has done in Afghanistan (Hitler 
reoccupied the Rhineland a few months before the 1936 Olympics).  Western Olympic 
committees may declare that by going to Moscow they are not endorsing the Soviets, but 
the Russians will surely see it differently.”79  Finally, after President Carter outlined his 
proposed Olympic boycott during his State of the Union Address, The New York Post 
called it an American duty to boycott the 1980 Summer Games. 
The Los Angeles Times also was a strong supporter of President Carter’s proposed 
Olympic boycott.  On January 18, 1980, the Los Angeles Times carried an editorial that 
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stated, “the United States should withdraw from the 1980 summer Olympic Games in 
Moscow in further protest against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.  It should 
withdraw as added proof of the seriousness with which it views this aggression.”80  In 
April, The Los Angeles Times continued to support President Carter’s proposed Olympic 
boycott, calling the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, “an affront to decency.”81  In 
the same editorial, The Los Angeles Times argued that a boycott “is well worth 
pursuing.”82 
While most conservative newspaper editorial columns (The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, The Chicago Tribune, and The Wall Street Journal) strenuously disagreed with 
President Carter’s new Cold War foreign policy, most supported his decision to boycott 
the 1980 Summer Olympics.  On January 28, 1980, The Chicago Tribune published an 
editorial in which it supported the proposed boycott:  “Perhaps it is true that by 
boycotting the games we would be injecting politics into the Olympics.  But it is just as 
true that if the games proceed normally, they will serve the much worse political 
purposes of the Soviet Union.”83  A day later, on January 29, 1980, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer showed its support for President Carter’s proposed Olympic boycott in its 
editorial section by writing, “boycotting the Moscow Olympics is one of the least painful 
choices the American people face if Soviet aggressiveness is not met with skill and 
firmness.”84  Finally, on January 7, 1980, The Wall Street Journal offered its support for 
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an Olympic boycott:  “Afghanistan shows how brutally [the Soviet Union] is willing to 
use its growing power to accomplish it ambition. [An Olympic boycott] would provide a 
clear opportunity to rally the Western people.”85  By making his Olympic boycott a 
domestic issue, President Carter was able to avoid much of the criticism he normally 
received from conservative newspaper editorial columns. 
President Carter’s proposed Olympic boycott was supported by many 
conservative newspapers, but it was not supported by all of them.  Specifically, The Daily 
Oklahoman criticized both President Carter’s altered Cold War foreign policy and his 
proposal to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow.  On January 17, 1980, 
in response to President Carter’s proposed Olympic boycott, The Daily Oklahoman 
published an editorial that stated, “A unilateral U.S. boycott of the Olympics would be 
more a placebo for American anger than an effective foreign policy tool.”86  The Daily 
Oklahoman clearly saw President Carter’s proposed Olympic boycott as foreign rather 
than domestic policy.    
President Carter garnered a large amount of newspaper editorial support for his 
proposed Olympic boycott because he successfully made it a domestic rather than a 
foreign policy issue.  He did so by connecting the Olympic boycott to national pride 
using history.  By invoking the sacrifices athletes like Ted Williams and Joe Lewis made 
during World War II, President Carter was able to gain the support of the American 
people.  As the public began to support President Carter’s proposed Olympic boycott, so 
did many newspaper editorials.  Although most newspaper editorial sections disagreed 
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with the altered Cold War foreign policy that President Carter unveiled during his 
January 23, 1980 State of the Union Address, most did not connect his proposed Olympic 
ban to the new foreign policy.  As a result President Carter’s strong push for a boycott of 
the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow was successful.  The failure of President Carter’s 
altered Cold War foreign policy (in the form of the Carter Doctrine) and the success of 
his Olympic boycott shows the division that existed in American newspaper editorials.  
While some of President Carter’s domestic policies were still supported by newspaper 
editorialists, his Cold War foreign policy was not.  Newspaper editorial sections across 
the country were clearly ready for a change in Cold War foreign policy.  Liberal 
newspaper editorial sections were calling for a return to détente, a policy they had fought 
against during the 1976 presidential election.  Meanwhile, conservative newspaper 
editorial sections were eager to end containment.  Furthermore, by 1980, conservative 
newspaper editorials were calling détente, a policy they had wholeheartedly supported 
during the 1976 Presidential election, dead.  Conservative newspaper editorial sections 
wanted the United States to start a second Cold War and engage the Soviet Union in a 
military arms race. 
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SECTION V 
 
Cold War Foreign Policy and the 1980 Presidential Election 
 
 
 
 
The 1980 Presidential election came at a time in American history when Cold 
War foreign policy was extremely important.  Consequently, the Cold War foreign 
policies of both candidates, Jimmy Carter (D) and Ronald Reagan (R), received a 
significant amount of newspaper editorial coverage. As in 1976, Cold War foreign policy 
discussions dominated the editorial sections of many newspapers during coverage of the 
presidential election. President Carter spent most of 1980 trying to move his Cold War 
foreign policy from the left to the right side of the political spectrum.  Ronald Reagan, 
President Carter’s Republican challenger, spent much of his energy attempting to 
convince the American public that his Cold War foreign policy was already on the 
conservative side and therefore better suited to protect America.  Newspaper editorial 
sections across the country had strong opinions.  Like most American citizens, newspaper 
editorialists had seen President Carter’s human rights based Cold War foreign policy fail.  
As a result, an almost universal disdain existed among newspaper editorial sections 
regarding President Carter’s Cold War foreign policy.  Liberal newspaper editorials 
began to promote a Cold War foreign policy that included a return to containment, a 
policy they had strenuously opposed to during the 1976 presidential campaign.  
Meanwhile, conservative newspaper editorial writers promoted a Cold War foreign 
policy that was founded on an aggressive military build-up.  Although most liberal 
newspapers condemned President Carter’s ambiguous Cold War foreign policy, only The 
New York Post was ready to embrace Ronald Reagan’s Cold War foreign policy, which 
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included a massive military build-up. Consequently, liberal newspapers again endorsed 
President Carter although some refused to endorse his Cold War foreign policy.  Even a 
conservative newspaper, The Philadelphia Inquirer, was so concerned about the military 
based foreign policy of Ronald Reagan that they chose to support President Carter in 
1980. By 1979, most conservative newspapers had shifted their view on Cold War 
foreign policy from that of containment to one of military build-up, in stark contrast to 
their views during the 1976 presidential election. For the most part, conservative 
newspapers endorsed the Cold War foreign policies of Ronald Reagan.  
President Carter entered the White House in 1976 intent on implementing a Cold 
War foreign policy “that focused on global North-South issues, nuclear arms control, and 
promoted human rights.”87  By 1980, it was evident that President Carter had failed.  The 
Soviet Union showed little respect for President Carter’s Cold War foreign policy 
between 1976 and 1980.  In 1979, the Soviet Union signed President Carter’s SALT II 
Treaty and then proceeded to invade Afghanistan.  By late 1979, even President Carter 
was ready to admit defeat: “The action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change 
in my opinion of what the Soviets’ ultimate goals are than anything they’ve done in the 
previous time I’ve been in office.”88  With the introduction of the Carter doctrine in 
January of 1980, President Carter began his quick transition (in terms of Cold War 
foreign policy) from left to right.  By re-implementing containment, asking Congress to 
increase defense spending, creating a Rapid Deployment Force, signing Presidential 
Decision Directive 59 (limited nuclear war fighting), and asking for an Olympic boycott 
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President Carter had quickly shifted his Cold War foreign policy from peace and 
negotiation to one reminiscent of earlier Cold Warriors.  President Carter was attempting 
to shift his Cold War foreign policy right, a position already occupied by Republican 
challenger Ronald Reagan.   
 Governor Reagan’s Cold War foreign policy was relatively simply.  Ronald 
Reagan believed the only way to contain the Soviet Union was to prevent them from 
expanding.  To do so, Reagan proposed a massive increase in defense spending that 
would lead to an arms race with the Soviet Union.  Furthermore, Reagan disagreed with 
the détente strategies used by Presidents Nixon and Ford.  Reagan steadfastly believed 
that the Soviet Union was using détente to hoodwink the United States.  Consequently, 
Governor Reagan did not believe the SALT negotiations being conducted by President 
Carter were worthwhile. 
 Although both The New York Times and The Boston Globe believed President 
Carter had mishandled the United States’ Cold War foreign policy during his first term as 
President, neither wanted the United States Cold War foreign policy to look like the one 
being proposed by Ronald Reagan.  Instead, as early as 1979, both The New Times and 
The Boston Globe urged President Carter to change his Cold War foreign policy.  In early 
1980, President Carter did so, introducing the Carter Doctrine.  Although both papers still 
chastised President Carter’s mishandling of America’s Cold War foreign policy, both 
were pleased with his decision to change his Cold War foreign policy and consequently 
supported his re-election.  On October 30, 1980, The Boston Globe published an editorial 
supporting the re-election of President Carter:  “When the pluses and minuses of Carter’s 
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foreign policy are weighed, they hardly seem a disaster.”89  Meanwhile, The Washington 
Post continued its support of President Carter and his changing Cold War foreign policy.  
However on October 30, 1980, The Washington Post noted that it only supported 
President Carter’s changing Cold War foreign policy because they viewed Governor 
Reagan’s alternative to be dangerous.90 
 Although Governor Reagan had lost the support of The Philadelphia Inquirer as a 
result of his “militaristic”91 Cold War foreign policy, he received the support of The Wall 
Street Journal, The Chicago Tribune, The Daily Oklahoman, and, the usually liberal New 
York Post.  On October 19, 1980, The Daily Oklahoman published an editorial in favor of 
both Ronald Reagan and his Cold War foreign policies.  In the editorial, The Daily 
Oklahoman called President Carter’s Cold War foreign policy a “military disaster”92 and 
labeled Ronald Reagan’s proposed policies “firm”93.  On October 26, The Chicago 
Tribune endorsed Reagan, calling President Carter’s Cold War foreign policy, “a source 
of confusion to our allies and a source of amusement for the Soviet Union.”94 
 The newspaper editorials published between 1976 and 1980 relating to Cold War 
foreign policy clearly had an effect on the Cold War foreign policies proposed by both 
President Carter and Governor Reagan during the 1980 presidential race.  President 
Carter realized both from international events and from liberal and conservative elite 
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media criticism that his human rights based Cold War foreign policy was not working.  
Consequently, President Carter shifted his Cold War foreign policy to the right, where 
many newspaper editorials claimed the United States’ Cold War foreign policy belonged.  
Governor Reagan also was influenced by the opinions of the elite media during the 1980 
presidential elections.  Like President Carter, Governor Reagan realized that any 
successful Cold War foreign policy would now have to lie to the right of both President 
Carter’s human rights based foreign policy as well as former President Nixon’s détente 
based Cold War foreign policy.  Consequently, Ronald Reagan refused to allow President 
Carter to move his policy to the right.  Instead, Governor Reagan argued that his Cold 
War foreign policy should be implemented because it was the first one that went far 
enough to the right of détente. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The Cold War foreign policy of the United States made two dramatic shifts 
between 1976 and 1980.  President Carter’s election in 1976 caused America’s Cold War 
foreign policy to shift from containment to human rights.  The failure of President 
Carter’s human rights based foreign policy caused the Cold War foreign policy of the 
United States to shift to a policy that favored a military build-up.  The international 
events that took place between 1976 and 1980 played a large role in the shifting Cold 
War foreign policies of the United States.  The shifting views of national security 
advisors and secretaries of state also played an important role in the changes made to the 
United States Cold War foreign policy during the late 1970’s.  The newspaper editorials 
reviewed for this thesis show that elite public opinion also affected Cold War foreign 
policy between 1976 and 1980.  Specifically, although liberal newspaper editorialists 
supported Jimmy Carter during the 1976 presidential election because of his political 
affiliation, they also did so because he offered a new Cold War foreign policy.  The New 
York Times, The Boston Globe, The Washington Post, and The New York Post all made it 
clear that not only did they support Jimmy Carter because he was a democrat they also 
supported him because of his new Cold War foreign policy.  Carter’s decision to make 
his Cold War foreign policy transparent (i.e. more accountable to the public and the elite 
media) was the result of pressure from elite newspaper editorialists.  Meanwhile, 
conservative newspaper editorial sections were firm in their support of détente 
throughout the 1976 presidential election.  As time passed, President Carter’s Cold War 
foreign policy began to change.  The change arose from international events taking place 
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in Africa, China, and the Middle East during the late 1970’s.  However, President Carter 
also changed his Cold War foreign policy in an attempt to get re-elected.  When President 
Carter changed his Cold War foreign policy, he did so by listening both to his advisors 
and to the elite media that had once supported him.  Liberal newspaper editorial sections 
had seen the events of 1976 as a wake-up call.  They urged President Carter to return to 
containment, and he did.  However, in promoting containment, the liberal elite mass 
media supported a Cold War policy it had previously rejected.  Meanwhile, conservative 
newspaper editorialists secured the attention of presidential candidate Ronald Reagan in 
1980 by shifting their Cold War foreign policy views from those that favored détente to 
those that favored a military build-up.  By abandoning détente, conservative newspaper 
editorial sections abandoned a policy they had once universally supported.  
The shift in Cold War foreign policy between 1976 and 1980 was not solely the 
result of changing newspaper editorial views on America’s Cold War foreign policy, but 
the effect influential newspaper editorials have on foreign policy is substantial.  Although 
most newspaper editorialists supported the policies of the political party their newspaper 
endorsed, all newspapers studied for this thesis changed their Cold War foreign policy 
perspectives between 1976 and 1980.  The liberal position on the United States Cold War 
foreign policy went from one that was against containment to one that was for 
containment and against a military build-up.  The shift in liberal Cold War foreign policy 
is evident in the opinions of the elite media.  The conservative position on the Cold War 
foreign policy of the United States went from one that favored détente to one that 
abandoned détente in favor of an arms race.  The change in conservative Cold War 
foreign policy also is evident in the opinions of members of the conservative elite media.  
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Using the analysis and opinions of the elite media (in both liberal and conservative 
newspaper editorial sections) provides students of many subjects another way to 
understand the dramatic shift that took place in Cold War foreign policy between 1976 
and 1980.  
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